Charlie Fairfax v. BINA48, (MD Ala. 2006)
Defendant’s Brief
Susan Fonseca-Klein, Esq.
Page 2 of 5
ISSUES:
I. Can the Defendant, BINA48 - a conscious computer, be sued?
II. Does the Plaintiff fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted?
III. Does the court lack jurisdiction to hear the instant case/controversy?
IV. Is the state of Alabama constitutionally prohibited from altering BINA48’s legal status?
V. Does the Defendant possess an affirmative defense under the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure?
ANALYSIS:
I. Plaintiff Cannot “Sue” BINA48 and Therefore Plaintiff’s Complaint Should be Dismissed. Ala. R. Civ. P. 17(b)
Plaintiff appears before this Court alleging breach of contract by its personal computer system, BINA48. Although breach of contract is a valid cause of action in Alabama, litigation against one's personal property is not.
– The capacity of an individual to sue and be sued is “determined by law.”
Under Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure 17(b), “The capacity of a party, including one acting in a representative capacity, to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of this state.” Ala. R. Civ. P. 17(b).
Alabama law governs the instant case. Alabama does not, and has not, recognized the existence of a legal duty owed by a machine, computer system or personal property whereby the chattel can be sued by its owner in court. The same is also true under Federal law.[1]
Plaintiff, as an Alabama resident, has the right to access Alabama's court system and “sue.” BINA48, on the other hand, is not considered “a party” or legal entity entitled to “be sued.”
While manufacturers and owners of property have been brought to court, the technology itself has not. Thus, a laptop computer, Word Perfect program, Blackberry cell phones, even your pet hamster cannot under Alabama law, be sued individually and required to legally defend itself in court.
Because Alabama does not impose a legal obligation on technology whereby “technology itself” can be sued, and because Plaintiff cannot prove otherwise, Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed.
II. Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and should therefore be dismissed. Ala. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
To succeed, Plaintiff must demonstrate that it has a valid state claim against BINA48. Plaintiff, however, will be unable to establish a prima facie case for breach of contract for the following reasons:
- No written or oral agreement existed between Plaintiff and BINA48.
In Alabama, Plaintiff must show the following elements to establish breach of contract:
1) that a valid contract existed between Plaintiff and BINA48;
2) that Plaintiff performed under the contract;
3) that BINA48 failed to perform under the contract; and
4) that Plaintiff was damaged as a result.
See Smoyer v. Birmingham Area Chamber of Commerce, 517 So.2d 585 (Ala. 1987).
Similarly, “[a]n oral contract is not entered into until the minds of the parties have met on all essential elements.” Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Bear, 220 Ala. 491 (1929); see also Wilson v. Vulcan Rivet and Bolt Corp., 439 So.2d 65 (Ala. 1983) (Holding that “In the absence of proof of a promise or agreement, and consideration, it was proper to direct a verdict in favor of [defendants] on the count alleging breach of contract.”).
In the instant case, no written contract existed between Plaintiff and BINA48. Plaintiff's failure to show the existence of a contract/meeting of the minds/agreement of any kind undermines his breach of contract claim.
Because Plaintiff has no valid cause of action by which to invoke Alabama's judiciary system, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails and should therefore be dismissed. Ala. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
- Alabama does not recognize a cause of action for breach of contract against “technology.”
Plaintiff himself asserted in his Memorandum that BINA48 was purchased and used in conjunction with his personal computer and Braingate system. In Plaintiff's own words, BINA48 was no more than very advanced technology. Alabama does not recognize a cause of action for breach of contract against “technology.”
Because Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, this Honorable Court should deny Plaintiff's Memorandum and dismiss the Complaint in its entirety.
However, should this Court find otherwise and hold that a contract did exist between Plaintiff and BINA48 it would be the first time that any court in any state found that a human and “technology” entered into a legally binding agreement.
III. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Hear the Instant
Case/Controversy.
(A) Subject Matter Jurisdiction:
Plaintiff argues it may pursue a valid claim in the Circuit Court of Tuscaloosa County, Alabama based on breach of contract. Plaintiff's argument fails because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.[2] Ala. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
As noted by the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex Parte Governor Fob James, 836 So. 2d 813 (Ala. 2002), “When a party without standing purports to commence an action, the trial court acquires no subject-matter jurisdiction. ... Standing is a necessary component of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. "Standing . . . turns on `whether the party has been injured in fact and whether the injury is to a legally protected right.'” Id. Standing is a jurisdictional prerequisite to every case and may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Id.
Plaintiff does not have a legally protected right to sue BINA48 for breach of contract. As stated earlier, no Alabama court or statute grants the owner of chattel the right to sue his personal property.
In this case, Plaintiff himself maintained that BINA48 was the equivalent of technology (albeit very efficient and advanced technology) and that he purchased and used the technology to play the online game called Everquest. Because Plaintiff does not have a legally protected right to sue his “technology”, standing is not met and subject matter jurisdiction does not attach to this Court.
Under Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure 19, “[w]henever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.” Ala. R. Civ. P. (h)(3).
(B) Personal Jurisdiction:
“The plaintiff carries the burden of proving the trial court's personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Ex parte Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904 So. 2d 226, 229 (Ala. 2004).
This Court lacks personal jurisdiction[3] over BINA48 because the required minimum contacts have not been met.
Rule 4.2(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., Alabama's "long-arm" provision[4], governs whether an Alabama court may exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. The Alabama Supreme Court recently outlined pertinent sections of Rule 4.2(b) inHiller Investments Inc. v. Insultech Group, Inc., 1051024 (Ala. 11-3-2006), stating:
(b) Basis for Out-of-State Service. An appropriate basis exists for service of process outside of this state upon a person or entity in any action in this state when the person or entity has such contacts with this state that the prosecution of the action against the person or entity in this state is not inconsistent with the constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States. . . .
This rule extends the personal jurisdiction of Alabama courts to the limit of due process under the United States and Alabama Constitutions. When applying Rule 4.2(b), this Court has interpreted the due process guaranteed under the Alabama Constitution as coextensive with that guaranteed under the United States Constitution.
"The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits a forum state to subject a nonresident defendant to its courts only when that defendant has sufficient ‘minimum contacts' with the forum state. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The critical question with regard to the nonresident defendant's contacts is whether the contacts are such that the nonresident defendant “'should reasonably anticipate being haled into court"' in the forum state.” [Emphasis added] Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985), quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980).
First we note that Rule 4.2(b) addresses only a “person or entity.” At no time has an Alabama court, or federal court, defined “person or entity” to include a non-biological sentient being or advanced technology like BINA48.
Second, the long-arm stature requires “minimum contacts” by BINA48 in Alabama.
Third, and finally, the “critical question” under Rule 4.2(b) is whether BINA48 reasonably anticipated litigating in Alabama.
Footnotes
[1] “The capacity of an individual, to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of the individual’s domicile.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b). The term individual does not include “technology.”
[2] Subject-matter jurisdiction of a court determines the kinds of claims or disputes over which it has jurisdiction, or the power to render a decision. See http://en.wikipedia.org
[3] Personal jurisdiction, jurisdiction of (or over) the person, or jurisdiction in personam is the power of a court to require that a party (usually the defendant) come before the court. The court must have personal jurisdiction to enforce its judgments or orders against a party. See http://en.wikipedia.org
[4] In United States jurisprudence, long arm jurisdiction is a statutory grant of jurisdiction to local courts over foreign defendants. A state's ability to confer jurisdiction is limited by the Constitution. This jurisdiction permits a court to hear a case against a defendant and enter a binding judgment against a defendant residing outside the state's jurisdiction. That is, without a long arm statute, a state's court may not have personal jurisdiction over a particular defendant. Generally, the authority of a court to exercise long arm jurisdiction must be based upon some action of the defendant which subjects him or her to the jurisdiction of the court. See http://en.wikipedia.org
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