Hybriduality and Geoethics
Martine Rothblatt, Ph.D.
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Consensual communications is absolutely essential to the ethical systems of “higher life”, such as the geoethical principle of consent. There is no way that one can obtain the prior consent of another to an action that may affect them without consensual communication. While all life forms, by definition, engage in some degree of consensual communication, for “lower” life forms it is limited to sexual reproduction or basic food gathering. Humans engage in a much greater degree of consensual communication than do lower animals. However, humans have a lot of “growth room” in consensual communications as is evidenced by the many disagreements, some violent, that result from inadequate attention to the geoethical principle of consent.
In a similar vein, Transcendence measures the extent to which an entity is enhancing fairness in the universe. Tools are essential to this task because raw nature is not fair – it kills with abandon, and it has no sympathy for the injured. It is a random process.
| “[H]igher” life forms have a much greater impact on the universe because of the leveraging capability of technology. | Technology is absolutely essential to ethical concepts such as equality of opportunity, and to the geoethical principle of equilibria. Technology is absolutely essential to ethical concepts such as equality |
of opportunity, and to the geoethical principle of equilibria. It is impossible to continue to add happiness to the world without tools to create more value. While all life forms make some contribution to universal order, “higher” life forms have a much greater impact on the universe because of the leveraging capability of technology.
Sociobiologists will not find it to be inordinately difficult to assign Vitology ratings to the plethora of biovitological life forms that permeate the earth. Cybersociologists will find it only somewhat more challenging to categorize infovitology by Vitology rank. As transvitological life forms emerge in the 21st century, we can expect steady movement toward the epitome of a V=1M being. Such a being would have many billions of times the information processing capability of humanity (something that is sure to be achieved with a century more of information technology development). Such a being would never adversely impact another without the other’s informed consent – this is the objective of consensual communication. And such a being would work feverishly toward the goal of building a just universe. This will arise by ensuring to each an unlimited opportunity for growth, and by extending to all a shelter from damage caused by catastrophic events, be they of terrestrial or extra-terrestrial origin.
The Autonomy and Coopetency of Life
Autonomy means independent action. For something to be autonomous it must be able to act based on decision rules reflected in remembered experiences, or in “birthright” algorithms, be it DNA or some other kind of original code. Even simple algae acts on its own because it processes information relevant to, among other things, converting sunlight, carbon dioxide and water into oxygen and glucose (photosynthesis), in accordance with decision rules contained within its birthright DNA code. The chloroplasts inside the algae, on the other hand, are not autonomous because they do not process information using their own decision rules. Instead, they obey the decision rules contained within the algae’s DNA.
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Image 11 – Apple Computer and Algae
As a very different example, consider the classic MacIntosh personal computer. Like the algae, it too processes information in accordance with a birthright code that is installed in its memory at the factory. It also acts autonomously by processing information in accordance with decision rules that others have subsequently fed into it. This is quite different from the chloroplast, which is never vested with decision rules, but is instead always simply carrying out the algae’s decision rules. In the case of a MacIntosh with a new program, there is a greater degree of autonomy, at least for a period of time, because the new program is vested in the MacIntosh. The original source of decision rules is not the most relevant issue in autonomy – all of us acquired our birthright decision rules from another source. What is key to autonomy is whether the subject entity has decision rules to use, or simply carries out instructions pursuant to the use of decision rules elsewhere.
Now, it may be said that every code was developed somewhere other than where it is used, and hence every entity with a code is simply “carrying out instructions pursuant to the use of decision rules elsewhere.” To a certain extent this is true, and indeed this is a nice way of describing the “We in Me.” Indeed, it may be said that autonomy exists to the extent that an entity is not simply carrying out instructions coded elsewhere, but is instead applying a code, in a differential manner, based on varying environmental inputs. The algae and the MacIntosh do not have much flexibility in how to apply their codes, but they do have some. Both algae DNA and MacIntosh programs describe rules for processing environmental inputs – that constitutes autonomous flexibility. The chloroplast, on the other hand, has no such flexibility because it has no code. Darkness tells the algae’s DNA to shut down photosynthesis; the chloroplast responds to instructions from this DNA, not from anything else.
Algae, and every other cell-based entity, are amazingly complex creations. But in its own ways, the MacIntosh computer is as amazing an entity as is an alga – and, of course, most people are generally sorrier for the crash of a MacIntosh than for the death of algae.
The extent of an entity’s autonomy can be calibrated as its computational capability because that directly measures decision-making capability, which is the sine qua non (end product) of autonomy. Humans have approximately 100 billion neurons, and each of them have up to 1000 connections to other neurons. In addition, each neuron can fire about 200 times per second. Consequently, the human mind is capable, at most, of about 100 billion x 1000 x 200 = 2 x 1016 cps. Hence, a human’s Autonomy value is A = 16. A MacIntosh computer, on the other hand, had a rated processor speed capability of about 1 x 106 cps. Thus, a MacIntosh has an Autonomy value of A = 6. An entity that had the incomprehensibly large processing capability of googol (10100) calculations per second would have an Autonomy value of A = 100.
The second criterion for life, Coopetency, means that an Autonomous entity is communicating consensually. Why is this requirement necessary for life? What entities demonstrate Autonomy but not Coopetency?
The Coopetency criterion is needed because life is important to us for its purpose of increasing justice, happiness, and fairness. Yet none of these goals can be achieved without consensual communication. A creature can be autonomous, and even quite intelligent, but vapidly destructive of all in its path. There is no reason to consider such a creature to be alive. Instead, it is simply an organic or inorganic threat, not dissimilar in nature from a natural catastrophe like a hurricane. The fact that it can act on its own does not rescue it from a vitological perspective if it is not communicating with those around it, and for higher life, seeking their consent to its actions. Such an entity will be destroyed not because it has forfeited its right to life, but because it is a threat to life. There never were any morally valid reasons to spare it harm because its raison d’etre (intention) was to harm others. If something has no ability to communicate, it cannot be faulted for not communicating.
Nor is this a matter of mere semantics. Something that acts like a typhoon does not get elevated to vitology by virtue of being made out of organic molecules. Similarly, something that acts like a pet doesn’t get downgraded to non-life by virtue of being made out of computer chips. The Coopetency criterion reminds us that it is the behavior of the entity, not its appearance that is important from a vitological perspective.
Application of the First Principle of Geoethics, the Principle of Consent, is a challenging test of Autonomy because it can only be satisfied by giving the fullest respect to autonomy. An autonomous agent that seeks the consent of another autonomous agent is demonstrating a high level of Autonomy because it is demonstrating high control of its actions. For example, a dog demonstrates a modest level of autonomy because when it decides what to do, either by genetic program or by training, it may take into account the sentiments of another autonomous entity (man or dog). Dogs don’t usually satisfy their internal needs without consideration of other autonomous beings, and this behavior can be enhanced through training. A bacterium or MacIntosh, on the other hand, demonstrates a low level of Autonomy because they pay little if any heed to the consent of other autonomous entities. Given that bacteria cannot give consent, humans are not obligated under the Principle of Consent to seek the consent of bacteria before eradicating them. The Principle of Consent applies amongst consent-capable beings, which effectively means co-planar life forms. In a similar vein, because dogs are capable of giving consent to some things, with respect to those things their consent needs to be obtained.